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The aim of the paper is to compare the employment performance at different levels of 
“regional” (dis)aggregation and to analyse the effectiveness of the European Employment Strategy 
in favouring net job creation and employment performance convergence.  
In the first part, the (quantitative) differences in “regional” labour market performances are 
highlighted and briefly discussed. In particular, using the main employment indicators, we compare 
the United States and the European Union, Mediterranean and non-Mediterranean EU countries, 
“old” and “new” EU members, the Italian macro-Regions, Regions, Provinces and, finally, some 
local labour systems.  
In the second part, the characteristics (method, instruments and final goals) and effectiveness of 
the European Employment Strategy (a complex “open method of co-ordination” of employment 
policies) are briefly analysed.  
 
2.  Comparison of the Employment Performance at Different Levels of “Regional” 
(Dis)Aggregation 
The difficulties of defining a “regional” perspective are briefly discussed before presenting the 
empirical analysis at different levels of (dis)aggregation.  
The comparative analysis of the labour market performance was conducted using the three 
quantitative objectives of the European Employment Strategy defined at the Councils of Lisbon 
(2000) and Stockholm (2001) as statistical indicators: (1) total employment rate (= total 
employment x 100 / working age population
1); (2) female employment rate (= female employment 
x 100 / female working age population); and (3) older worker employment rate (= employed 
persons from 55 to 64 years old x 100 / population between 55 and 64 years old).  
The use of the employment indicators in the comparative analysis is preferable with respect to 
unemployment indicators
2 for many reasons: (i) difficulties and differences in defining an 
unemployed condition; (ii) dependence of the unemployment rate on the rate of participation and of 
                                                 
∗ An earlier version of this paper has been presented at the international conference on “Espaces et temps de 
l’Europe: Mediterranean Europe” (University of Florence, September 2-4, 2004). I want to thank Milica 
Uvalic, Marta Petricioli and many participants to the above conference. 
1 The working age population is considered as the population between 15 and 64 years old.  
2
the latter on the employment rate. In particular, the compared evidence shows that similar 
unemployment rates are compatible with significant differences in employment rates
3. 
 
2.1. Difficulties Defining a “Regional” Perspective 
A “regional” dimension is characterised by extreme variations in the levels of possible 
(dis)aggregations and is generally used for comparative analysis between the considered areas.  
In order to highlight the potential importance of the level(s) of (dis)aggregation, we have 
designated five possible levels: A (the highest aggregation), B, C, D and E (the lowest aggregation). 
Then, with reference to one or more performance variable(s) and considering the possibility that a 
certain set of units (“regions”) has a “high” (H) or a “low” (L) differentiation
4, we discuss a few 
particular cases (Table 1), arising from the empirical analysis (ex-post) and unknown ex-ante. In 
case 1, the degree of “regional” differentiation is not significant at any of the levels of aggregation; 
in case 2 the degree of “regional” differentiation is only significant at one level (level A); in case 3 
the degree of “regional” differentiation is significant at more levels (levels B, C, D and E); and in 
case 4 the degree of “regional” differentiation is significant at every level of (dis)aggregation (A, B, 
C, D and E). 
Table 1 – Some particular cases of multilevel regional differentiation 















Case 1  L  L  L  L  L 
Case 2  H  L  L  L  L 
Case 3  L  H  H  H  H 
Case 4  H  H  H  H  H 
…….. …..  …..  …..  …..  ….. 
Notes: H = high differences; L = low differences. 
The levels of aggregation that can be levels of government are highlighted in bold. 
Nuts 0, I, II and III are the statistical regions defined by the European Union and largely 
corresponding to institutional (government) levels.  
 
Obviously, with one or more “regional” levels that differ significantly there are important 
methodological implications and the empirical results depend strongly on the level of analysis 
chosen. For example, in case 2, we find a “regional” differentiation only if the empirical analysis 
was carried out at the level of (dis)aggregation A; as for the other levels of (dis)aggregation, the 
results show that there are no “regional” differences. In case 3, if the empirical analysis was 
conducted at level A, we do not find significant “regional” differences, but performance differences 
exist at the other levels of (dis)aggregation. Finally, in case 4 it is useful to consider all the different 
                                                                                                                                                                  
2 The unemployment rate is calculated as follows: n° unemployed x 100 / labour force; with labour force = 
employment + unemployment. 
3 Besides, considering the importance of the fiscal wedge on labour (social contributions and labour income 
tax), the total employment rates are also relevant indicators of the sustainability of the national welfare 
systems.  
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levels of (dis)aggregation for a comparative analysis that takes into account the complex multilevel 
regional differentiation. So, the results and the policy implications (governance) of a comparative 
(“regional”) analysis strongly depend on the level(s) of (dis)aggregation considered. Besides, there 
is a potential risk in choosing just one level of (dis)aggregation and the need for a multi-level 
comparative investigation arises. A large part of the existing literature that compare the labour 
market performance only considers one (ad hoc) “regional” level of analysis. In this paper we 
compare the employment performance at different levels of “regional” (dis)aggregation (groups of 
countries, national, regional, provincial and local levels), as highlighted in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 – Different levels of comparative empirical analysis 
Level of (dis)aggregation 
(increasing order) 
 
the European Union (EU) versus the United States   
International 
macro-areas  Mediterranean EU members versus non-Mediterranean EU members 
“old” and “new” EU countries   
National level 







Local labour systems in Umbria Region 
 
2.2. International Macro-areas 
Many empirical analyses compare the labour market performance of large international macro-
areas. Here we briefly compare the European Union versus the United States and Mediterranean 
versus non-Mediterranean  EU countries. 
As is well-known, the empirical evidence highlights the existence of significant gaps between 
the United States and the European Union
5 with respect to employment performance. A part of the 
empirical and theoretical literature has used the term “eurosclerosis” to describe the lower level of 
employment and net job creation in the European Union
6.  
 
Table 3 - Employment rates in the European Union and the United States (2000) 
  Total 
 Employment rate
Female  
Employment rate  
55-64  
Employment rate 
European Union (15)  64  54  39 
United States  74  68  58 
coefficient of variation  0.10  0.16  0.28 
Source: OECD – Employment Outlook (2002). 
Notes: Total Employment rate = employment x 100 / working age population 15-64.  
Female Employment rate = female employment x 100 / female working age population.  
Older worker Employment rate = 55-64 employment x 100 / 55-64 population. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
4 Obviously, the distinction in two possible situations (high or low) is for simplify the theoretical analysis. 
5 A compared view of employment performance in US and EU is proposed, for example, in Sapir (2004). 
6 The existence of labour market rigidities is considered one of the main causes of the inadequate 
employment performance in European Union.  
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Notice that, at this level of aggregation, Europe is considered as one “region”, without the 
possibility of considering (eventual) differences between (and within) countries. 
Some authors
7 have distinguished the European countries into Mediterranean and non-
Mediterranean countries, in order to investigate the existence of a particular Mediterranean labour 
market model (structure and performance). The main employment data are presented in Table 4, 




Table 4 - Employment rates in Mediterranean and non-Med. EU members (2003) 







Mediterranean “old” EU countries: 




coeff. of var.= 0.07
50.0 
 
coeff. of var.= 0.16 
40.3 
 
coeff. of var.= 0.19
Non-Mediterranean “old” EU countries: 
(Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden, United 
Kingdom, Finland, Austria, Germany, 













coeff. of var.= 0.30
Mediterranean “new” EU countries: 
(Cyprus, Malta and Slovenia) 
62.1 
 
coeff. of var.= 0.12
50.5 
 
coeff. of var.= 0.29 
34.7 
 
coeff. of var.= 0.40
non-Mediterranean “new” EU countries: 
(Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 















coeff. of var.= 0.29 
 
Source: elaboration on Eurostat data (2004). 
 
Notice that the well-known negative employment gap of the Mediterranean EU countries 
versus non-Mediterranean EU members is not true considering the total employment rate of the new 
EU members. 
Obviously, the above arbitrary aggregations
9 can mask marked employment differences at the 
national level of analysis. 
 
2.3. National Level of Comparison  
The national level of analysis was conducted distinguishing between the “old” and “new” EU 
members
10, with particular attention directed toward the Mediterranean EU countries. 
Considering the main “Lisbon objective”, only four countries of the EU-15 have reached a 
total employment rate higher than 70% (Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom); 
                                                 
7 See, for example, Bettio - Villa (1995). 
8 Ten new countries entered the European Union in May 2004 (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech 
Republic, the Slovak Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta). 
9 In particular, we decide to include Portugal and Slovenia between the Mediterranean EU countries.  
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while eight countries (four of the EU-15 and four “new” EU members) have an employment rate 
(ER) lower than 60% (Spain, Belgium, Greece, the Slovak Republic, Hungary, Italy, Malta and 
Poland). The remaining countries (seven of the EU-15 and seven “new” members) show an ER 
between 60 and 70%. As regards the second “Lisbon objective”, eight countries of the EU-15 plus 
Cyprus have a female employment rate higher than 60% (Sweden, Denmark, The Netherlands, 
Finland, the United Kingdom, Austria, Portugal and Cyprus), while five countries (three of the EU-
15 and two “new” EU members) show a female ER lower than 50% (Spain, Poland, Greece, Italy 
and Malta). The remaining countries have a female ER between 50 and 60%. Considering the third 
European goal, defined at the Stockholm Council, only six countries (four of the EU-15 and two 
“new” EU members) have an employment rate for older workers (55-64) higher than 50% (Sweden, 
Denmark, the United Kingdom, Estonia, Portugal and Cyprus), while six countries (two of the EU-
15 and four “new” EU members) show a 55-64 ER lower than 30% (Luxembourg, Hungary, 
Belgium, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia). Five countries have a 55-64 ER between 30 
and 40%, while the remaining has an older worker ER between 40 and 50%.  
 



































































































































































Source: Eurostat 2004. 
Note: The Mediterranean EU members are indicated in bold. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
10 Notice that the EU co-ordination on employment policies is an important part of the Community aquis.  
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A fourth European objective, not defined in precise quantitative terms, regards the reduction 
of irregular employment in the shadow economy. In the “old” EU members, the size of the shadow 
economy (as % of GNP) is the lowest in Austria (9.8%) and the highest in Greece (28.7%) and Italy 
(27.1%), with an EU-15 mean of 18.6. In the “new” EU members the shadow economy is generally 
higher than in the “old” EU countries, with an average of 26.9%. In particular, the Slovak and 
Czech Republics have the lowest incidence (18.9% and 19.1%), while the shadow economy is much 
more relevant in Latvia (39.9%) and Lithuania (30.3%).  
 
Table 6 -   The size (% of GDP) of the shadow economy in the European Union (1999-2000) 
“old” EU members  “new” EU members 













































Luxembourg   n.a. 
 
mean 





mean (all countries)    21.4 
coefficient of variation (all countries)    0.33 
Source: Schneider (2003) calculations based on “currency demand approach” (EU-15) 
and Schneider (2003) calculations based on World Bank data, Washington 
D.C., 2002 (“new” EU members).   
Note: n.a. = not available. 
 
 
It should be noted (Graph 1) that a significant negative correlation exists between the total 
(regular) employment rate and the size of the shadow economy. So, the countries with the worst 










Graph 1 – Relationship between the total employment rate and the size of the shadow economy 
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Source: elaboration based on Eurostat (2004) and Schneider (2003) data. 
 
Considering the national level of the Mediterranean EU countries, significant differences arise, 
especially in female employment rates and “older worker” employment rates. Cyprus and Portugal 
are at the top of the ranking in all three indicators, with female ER and “older worker” employment 
rates that are higher than the European objectives. In contrast, Malta and Italy have extremely low 
employment rates. 
 


















































54.5  Malta 33.6  Slovenia  23.5 
Mean 







Source: Eurostat, Employment in Europe 2004. 
Note: in bold are indicated the “old” Mediterranean EU members. 
 
It is of interest to briefly consider the employment rates (for the most numerous nationality 
groups) of non-EU nationals living in the European Union (15). Notice the significant differences, 
with the US and Croatia at the top of the ranking and Algeria and Marocco at the bottom (especially 
considering the female employment rates).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
11 Employment in illegal activities is excluded from the definition of “irregular employment”.  
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Table 8  – Employment rates of third country nationals (rankings 2002) 
Total Employment rates  Female Employment rates 
































EU nationals  66    59 
Source: Eurostat, LFS (2003). 
 
In conclusion, it should be noted that empirical evidence highlights the existence of huge 
differences in national employment performances in the European Union. So, the EU cannot be 
properly considered as just one (homogeneous) “region” (for example, to be compared to the US). 
 
2.4. Italian Sub-National Levels 
The national averages can mask remarkable sub-national differences. In this part we briefly 
consider the Italian sub-national levels of (dis)aggregation: macro-Regions, Regions, Provinces and, 
briefly, the local labour systems in the Region of Umbria. 
A first level of (dis)aggregation distinguishes the country in four macro-regions (“Northwest”, 
“Northeast”, “Centre” and “South and Islands”). The employment performance differences are 
remarkable, especially in the female ER.  
 
Table 9 - Employment rates (ER) in Italian macro-regions (2003) 
  Total ER  Female ER  55-64 ER 
North-east 65.4  55.1  29.0 
North-west 63.2  52.3  26.0 
Centre 59.1  46.9  33.4 
South and Islands  44.1  27.1  32.8 
 
Coefficient of variation  0.17  0.28  0.11 
Source: Istat, Labour Force Survey (2004). 
 
However, the macro-regional level can hide significant differences that arise only with a 
higher (dis)aggregation. Therefore we have analysed the main employment indicators for the 20 
Italian Regions and the 103 Provinces.  
As for the main “Lisbon objective”, in 2002 all the Regions had an employment rate lower 
than 70%. In particular, nine Regions (Emilia Romagna, Trentino Alto Adige, Valle d’Aosta, 
Lombardy, Veneto, The Marches, Piedmont, Friuli Venezia Giulia and Tuscany) had an  
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employment rate (ER) in the upper part of the ranking (60-70), five regions had an ER between 50 
and 60% and, finally, six regions (Sicily, Campania, Calabria, Puglia, Basilicata and Sardinia) had 
an ER lower than 50%. Considering the second “Lisbon objective”, all the Regions had a female 
employment rate lower than 60%, ranging from a maximum of 59.1% to a minimum of 24.3%). In 
particular, nine Regions had a female employment rate (FER) in the upper part of the ranking (50-
60), four Regions had an ER between 40 and 50%, two Regions had a female ER between 30 and 
40% and, finally, five Regions (Campania, Sicily, Calabria, Puglia and Basilicata) had a female ER 
lower than 30%. 
As for the older workers (55-64), it should be noted that the lowest ER was in the Northern 
Regions (Table 12). 
  Finally, the Regions with lower (regular) employment rates are generally characterised by 
higher incidence of  irregular employment
12 (Table 13). 
 
Table 10 - Total employment rates in Italian Regions (2002) 
ER 40-50% 
 
Sicily (42.2), Campania (42.2), Calabria (42.3), Puglia (45.5), Basilicata (46.3) and 
Sardinia (47.0). 
ER 50-60%  Molise (52.1), Lazio (55.2), Abruzzo (55.8), Liguria (58.5) and Umbria (59.2).  
ER 60-70% 
  
Tuscany (61.8), Friuli Venezia Giulia (62.2), Piedmont (62.2), The Marches (63.0), Veneto 
(63.4), Lombardy (63.4), Valle d’Aosta (66.4), Trentino Alto Adige (66.6) and Emilia 
Romagna (67.8). 
Coefficient of variation = 0.16 
Source: Istat, 2003. 
 
Table 11 - Female employment rates in Italian Regions (2002) 
ER < 30%  Campania (24.3), Sicily (24.5), Calabria (26.6), Puglia (27.7) and Basilicata (29.7). 
ER 30-40%  Sardinia (31.5) and Molise (37.1). 
ER 40-50%  Abruzzo (41.3), Lazio (41.4), Liguria (47.1) and Umbria (48.1). 
ER 50-60% 
 
Veneto (50.9), Tuscany (50.9), Piedmont (51.8), Friuli Venezia Giulia (51.9), Lombardy 
(52.0), The Marches (53.0), Trentino Alto Adige (55.0), Valle d’Aosta (56.5) and Emilia 
Romagna (59.1). 
Coefficient of variation = 0.27 
Source: Istat, 2003. 
  
Table 12 – Older worker (55-64) employment rates in Italian Regions (2003) 
ER <25%  Friuli Venezia Giulia (24.2). 
ER 25-30%  Lombardy (25.7), Piedmont (26.2), Liguria (27.0), Sardinia (27.3), Veneto 
(27.8), Valle d’Aosta (29.2) and Umbria (29.5). 
ER 30-35% 
 
The Marches (30.1), Trentino Alto Adige (30.6), Basilicata (31.5), Tuscany 
(31.6), Emilia Romagna (31.6), Sicily (31.7), Puglia (31.8) and Campania 
(34.4). 
IER >35%  Molise (37.2), Lazio (36.3), Calabria (36.1) and Abruzzo (35.8) 
  Coefficient of variation = 0.12 
Source: Istat (2004). 
 
 
                                                 
12 In Table 13, the irregular employment is measured in labour units corresponding to the full time 
employment (for example, two part-time irregular jobs are computed as one irregular labour unit). So, the 
number of workers involved in “irregular jobs” is much higher than the number of labour units.  
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Table 13 – Irregular employment rates in Regions (2000) 
IER 10-15%  Emilia Romagna (10.1), Lombardy (10.5), Veneto (11.2), Piedmont (11.2), 
Trentino Alto Adige (13.0), Tuscany (13.2), Friuli Venezia Giulia (13.2), 
Liguria (13.3), The Marches (13.8) and Abruzzo (14.1). 
IER 15-20%  Valle d’Aosta (15.9), Umbria (16.6), Lazio (17.4), Molise (18.1) and 
Sardinia (18.3). 
IER 20-25%  Puglia (20.0), Basilicata (22.0), Sicily (23.6) and Campania (24.7). 
IER more than 25%  Calabria (29.2). 
coefficient of variation = 0.32 
Source: Istat, National Account (2002). 
Notes: Irregular labour units as % of total labour units. 
 
The empirical evidence at the Regional level can also hide differences arising at a Provincial 
level of aggregation (Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix). In particular, three Provinces (Bolzano, 
Ravenna and Reggio Emilia) have reached the main “Lisbon objective” (70%), 16 Provinces 
(Modena, Forlì, Bologna, Belluno, Siena, Mantova, Aosta, Biella, Cuneo, Novara, Treviso, Parma, 
Vicenza, Prato, Pordenone and Ferrara) have a total employment rate near the European objective 
(from 65% to 70%), 36 Provinces have an ER in the 60-65% class and 48 Provinces have an ER 
lower than 60%. Notice that 20 Provinces have an ER between 50 and 60%; 22 Provinces have an 
ER in the class 40-50% and, finally, six Provinces have an extremely low ER (lower than 40%). 
As illustrated in Figure 1, the Provincial level presents a much more articulated differentiation 
with respect to the well-known “North-South” dualism. 
Figure 1 - Groups of Provinces according to the total employment rate (2002) 
 
Source: Elaboration on Istat data (2003) 
Italian Provinces
66,9 to  70,8   (8)
62,7 to  66,9   (29)
58,5 to  62,7   (20)
54,3 to  58,5   (9)
50,1 to  54,3   (9)
45,9 to  50,1   (8)
41,7 to  45,9   (11)
37,5 to  41,7   (9) 
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The provincial differences in the female ER (Table A2 in Appendix) are huge, with a 
maximum of 62.5% (Ravenna) and a minimum of 16.7% (Caltanisetta). In 2002 only six Provinces 
(Siena, Forlì, Bologna, Modena, Reggio Emilia and Ravenna) had reached the second “Lisbon 
objective” (more than 60%). Eight other Provinces followed in the 55-60% class and 31 Provinces 
were in the 50-55% class. It should be noted that 57 Provinces report a female employment rate 
lower than 50% and, in particular, 22 Provinces have a female ER that is lower than half (30%) of 
the European objective. 
Notice that, the Provincial level of empirical analysis can also be inadequate if significant 
differences exist at the local level. By introducing the concept of the Local labour system that 
belongs to the more general category of the “travel-to-work areas” allows the issue of a functional 
repartition of the Italian territory into local socio-economic systems to be addressed (Istat, 1997). 
Some studies have highlighted the existence of significant differences in employment performance 
between the 784 Italian local labour systems, also within the same Province (or Region)
13. Notice 
that even considering a small Italian Region, like Umbria
14, it is possible to find significant 
differences in employment performance among the 16 local labour systems (Table A3 in 
Appendix). Obviously, the employment performance differences, at the local labour system level, in 
the larger and southern Regions (and Provinces) are much higher than in the Region of Umbria. 
In conclusion, since all the possible levels of “regional” (dis)aggregation show a significant 
degree of differentiation, the comparative empirical analysis must consider all the levels of 
(dis)aggregation, in order to derive articulated suggestions for an effective co-ordinated mix of 
(European, national, regional and local) policy interventions. 
 
2.5.  A Synthetic View of the Degrees of Multilevel Regional Differentiation  
  Here the differences in employment performances are briefly compared considering the 
variability (range and coefficient of variation) at the various levels of (dis)aggregation previously 
considered. The ranges (max-min) of employment rates are remarkable at various levels of 
(dis)aggregation, especially for the female ER (Graph 3), but they are particularly high at the Italian 
sub-national levels. 
  The “regional” variability at different levels of (dis)aggregation has been briefly analysed 
using the coefficient of variation (c.v.)
15. In general, this index is much higher for female 
employment rates than for total employment rates (Graph 4), highlighting a lower variability in the 
                                                 
13 See, for example, Perugini – Signorelli (2004b). Notice that the distances in the stock indicator 
(employment rate) can be the result of huge differences in the flow indicators. 
14 The Umbria Region is composed of two Provinces, Perugia (divided into 13 local labour systems) and 
Terni (divided into three local labour systems). 
15 The coefficient of variation is a “pure number” and is obtained by dividing the standard deviation by the 
mean.  
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male employment rates. Notice that, the c.v. for the female employment rate in the Mediterranean 
EU countries is higher than that reported for the EU-15 and EU-25; the opposite is true for the total 
employment rates. Finally, the coefficients of variation are particularly high at the Italian sub-
national levels, with the exception of the macro-Regional level for the total employment rate. 
 







































Italian Regions  Italian Provinces 
 
Source: OECD, Eurostat and Istat data. 
Note: 2000 for US vs. EU; 2003 for EU-15, EU-25 and Mediterranean EU-25; 2002 for Italian sub-national levels. 
 





































Italian Regions  Italian Provinces 
 
Source: OECD, Eurostat and Istat data. 
Note: 2000 for US vs. EU; 2003 for EU-15, EU-25 and Mediterranean EU-25; 2002 for Italian sub-national levels.  
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Female employment rates Total employment rates
 
Source: elaboration on OECD, Eurostat and Istat data. 
Note: 2003 for EU-15, EU-25 and Mediterranean EU-25; 2002 for Italian sub-national levels. 
 
 
3. The European Employment Strategy: an Effective Open Method of Co-ordination? 
The Luxembourg Job Summit (1997) launched the European Employment Strategy (EES) 
based on the new provisions in the Employment title of the Amsterdam Treaty. At the Lisbon 
Council (2000), the European Union set a new strategic goal for the next decade: “to become the 
most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable 
economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion”. The strategy was 
designed to enable the Union to regain the conditions for full employment
16. The EES is designed to 
be the main tool for giving direction to and ensuring the co-ordination of the employment policies 
of the Member States. In particular, the EES initiated a new working method (the so-called “open 
method of co-ordination”) based on five key principles: (i) subsidiarity, (ii) convergence, (iii) 
management by objectives, (iv) country surveillance and (v) integrated approach. The co-ordination 
of the employment policies at the EU level consists of: (i) Employment Guidelines of the European 
Council, following a Commission proposal; (ii) National Action Plan (and Regional Action Plan) 
which describes how the Guidelines are put into practice at the national (and regional) levels; (iii) a 
Joint Employment Report presented by the Commission and the Council examining each National 
                                                 
16 The Lisbon Council confirmed the EES and  defined two employment goals to be obtained by 2010: (i) an 
overall EU employment rate of 70% and (ii) a female employment rate higher than 60%. The Stockholm  
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Action Plan; (iv) Recommendations decided by a qualified majority of the Council, in response to a 
proposal by the Commission, and addressed to all members (general recommendations) and to each 
country (country-specific recommendations). 
The Employment Guidelines are a set of objectives which, until 2003, consisted of four 
“pillars”: (i) employability, (ii) entrepreneurship, (iii) adaptability and (iv) equal opportunities. The 
2003 revision of the EES highlighted three “new” general objectives [(i) full employment, as 
defined in Lisbon and Stockholm ; (ii) quality and productivity at work (employment growth must 
be accompanied by productivity changes in order to permit real wage increases); and (iii) a cohesive 
and inclusive labour market (employment is a crucial means to social inclusion)] and ten specific 
guidelines [(i) active and preventive measures for the unemployed and inactive (for example: job 
search assistance and personalised action plans); (ii) job creation and entrepreneurship; (iii) address 
change and promote adaptability and mobility in the labour market (for example: introduce 
diversity of contractual and working arrangements; favour a better balance between work and 
private life and between flexibility and security; increase the transparency of employment and 
training opportunities); (iv) promote development of human capital and lifelong learning; (v) 
increase labour supply and promote active ageing (for example: make work pay and reform early 
retirement schemes); (vi) gender equality (for example reconciling work and private life); (vii) 
promote integration and combat discrimination against disadvantaged people in the labour market; 
(viii) make work pay through incentives to enhance work attractiveness (for example, reducing the 
high marginal effective tax rate, especially for low-wage workers); and (ix) transform undeclared 
work into regular employment; (x) address regional employment disparities. The European Social 
Fund is the main financial support for the European Employment Strategy. Notice that the EES, and 
the Employment Guidelines in particular, have increasingly incorporated the local dimension, by 
inviting member States to involve the regional and local levels. Obviously the governance of EES 
also depends on the political and constitutional structure of each Member State. However, the 
implementation of the Strategy calls for the involvement of all relevant actors (member States, 
Regions, social partners, civil society), in accordance with the wide diversity in national 
institutional structures and social dialogue practices.  
The evaluation of the results of the EES is extremely difficult, but there is some striking 
evidence for the period 1997-2003: (i) employment (especially permanent employment) 
significantly increased in the European Union, even in recent years with the extremely low GDP 
growth rates (the employment/GDP elasticity increased remarkably); (ii) unemployment declined, 
especially long-term unemployment (the decline of unemployment was lower than the increase of 
employment due to higher participation in the labour market); (iii) the process information 
exchange between member States permitted a better evaluation of the transferability of good 
                                                                                                                                                                  
European Council (2001) added a third goal: (iii) an employment rate higher than 50% (by 2010) for older  
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practices; (iv) since 2000, a better definition of the objectives (total employment rate, female 
employment rate and older worker employment rate), with a greater emphasis on net employment 
creation  rather than unemployment reductions, has favoured some labour market reforms and better 
use of many instruments (public and private employment services, life-long learning, wage 
moderation, etc.).   
As for the quantitative employment changes in the period 1997-2002, the significant positive 
change in each EU member State should be noted, with a 3.6 total ER increase in the European 
Union (Table 15). Notice that the net employment creation was more than 12 million in five years, 
with around 10 million new permanent jobs. 
 
Table 15 - Employment changes (period 1997-2002) 




ER 2002 – ER 1997 















Spain +9.1  +3031 +2346  +699
Ireland +7.8  +349 +287  -30
Netherlands +5.9  +908 +568  +303
Finland +4.8  +304 +251  +55
Italy +4.2  +1451 +1069  +381
Sweden +4.1  +412 +251  +185
Luxembourg +3.8  +20 +16  +4
France +3.5  +2203 +1658  +521
Belgium +3.0  +249 +188  +61
Portugal +2.6  +496 +144  +422
United Kingdom  +1.7  +1710 +1972  -182
Germany +1.7  +763 +746  +194
Greece +1.6  +266 +228  +38
Austria +1.5  +119 +122  -4
Denmark +1.0  +66 +109  -49
European Union 15  +3.6  +12346 +9957  +2598
Source: Employment in Europe, European Commission (2003). 
 
 
The employment growth during the period 1997-2002 included a 79% increase in permanent 
contracts (+44% female and +35 male) and 21% increase in temporary jobs (+13% female and +8% 
male). In addition, the employment creation is divided into +69% full-time contracts (+36% male 





                                                                                                                                                                  
(55-64) workers.  
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Source: elaboration on Eurostat data (2003). 
 
 
It should be noted that a negative relationship exists between the Total employment rates in 
1997 and the net job creation
17 in the period 1997-2002. The countries with lower employment rates 
in 1997 had better performances in the period 1997-2002, causing a convergence process of 
national employment performances. So, the period 1997-2002 has been extremely positive in terms 
of both net job creation (in all the EU-15 countries) and employment performance convergence. 
 
 
                                                 
17 The net job creation in the period 1997-2002 is measured by the difference between the total employment 
rate (ER) in 2002 and the total ER in 1997.  
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Graph 6 – Relationship between the initial (1997) Total Employment Rates  





















































Source: elaboration based on Eurostat (2004) and Schneider (2003) data. 
 
Considering the NUTS II level
18 of (dis)aggregation in the EU-15, we estimate the following 
regression for 201 Regions in the period 1999-2003
19.  
 
ΔER1999-2003 = α + βER1999 + ε 
 
Table 16 – β convergence of Regional Employment Rates in EU-15  (period 1999-2003): estimates 







Number of Observations: 201 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.328 
Prob F: 0.0000 
 
Source: elaboration on Eurostat Regions Database (2004). 
 
The regression exhibits an estimated value of the β coefficient which is negative and significant, 
implying a convergence dynamic in total employment rate in the 201 European Regions. So, the  
                                                 
18 As for Italy, this level corresponds to the 20 Regions. 
19 See, Perugini and Signorelli (2004c). In the period 1999-2003 the regional (NUTS II level) data are 
comparable.    
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EU-15 Regions with the lower total employment rate in 1999 performed better in the period 1999-
2003. 
We argue that the European Employment Strategy, which favours a multilevel governance that 
is aware of the extreme differences at the different levels of “regional” (dis)aggregations, has 
contributed positively to the net job creation and employment performance convergence in the EU 
countries and (NUTS II) Regions. 
 
3. Some Policy Implications 
The existence of more than one “regional” level of significant differentiation has important 
methodological consequences. In particular, the empirical results (and policy implications) are very 
dependent on the level(s) of analysis chosen. 
A comparative multilevel “regional” analysis provides crucial information for defining an 
effective governance of employment policies. In particular, because the differences in employment 
performance are significant at many levels of (dis)aggregation, as highlighted for the EU members 
and, especially, at the Italian sub-national levels, the policy implications clearly favour a 
governance based on multilevel “regional” employment policies, co-ordinated at the highest level of 
aggregation (European level) and implemented at the lower levels (national, regional and local), 
according to the subsidiarity principle
20.  
The European Employment Strategy (EES), adopting an “open method of co-ordination”
21, 
takes into account the significant differences in employment performance at the various “regional” 
levels of (dis)aggregation. We argue that the remarkable net job creation and employment 
performance convergence in the EU countries and Regions were partly due to the positive role 
played by the EES in favouring the creation and implementation of co-ordinated multilevel 
“regional” employment policies.  
Further employment growth in the worst-performing EU countries (and Regions) can be 
obtained favouring the emersion of irregular labour and the diffusion of part-time contracts. 
Obviously, improvement and changes in the composition of the European
22 and national/regional 




                                                 
20 It is important to take in to account of possible (negative and positive) spatial spillovers (e.g. Bollino – 
Signorelli, 2003). 
21 The EES is based on both vertical and horizontal subsidiarity principle. 
22 For example, a reduction of the European resources devoted to the agricultural sector (characterised by a 
low and decreasing sectoral employment rate) would be accompanied by an increase in the European 
Social Fund supporting the European Employment Strategy. 
23 In this paper the analysis is limited to the main quantitative indicators of labour market performance, 
without considering the quality of the jobs (e.g. the diffusion of “working poor”) and the changes in 
productivity and real wages.   
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Table A1 - Total employment rates in Italian Provinces (2002) 
ER < 40% 
(6 Provinces) 
Crotone (37.5), Agrigento (38.1), Caltanisetta (38.1), Palermo (39.1), Caserta (39.3) and 
Naples (39.8). 
ER 40-45% 
( 8 Provinces) 
Enna (40.9), Reggio Calabria (41.3), Catania (41.6), Cosenza (42.4), Foggia (42.6), Vibo 
Valentia (42.7), Taranto (43.3) and Salerno (44.5).  
ER 45-50% 
( 14 Provinces) 
 
Cagliari (45.1), Catanzaro (45.2), Lecce (45.2), Siracusa (45.5), Brindisi (45.7), 
Trapani(45.7), Matera (46.0), Potenza (46.6), Nuoro (46.7), Messina (46.7), Bari (47.8), 
Oristano (47.8), Ragusa (48.2) and Frosinone (49.9). 
ER 50-55% 
(11 Provinces) 
Sassari (50.2), Rieti (50.7), Latina (50.8), Avellino (51.4), Campobasso (51.5), Viterbo 
(51.8), Terni (53.6), Isernia (53.9), La Spezia (54.3), Benevento (54.4) and Chieti (54.6). 
ER 55-60% 
( 9 Provinces) 
Massa (55.0), Teramo (55.6), Livorno (56.3), Pescara (56.4), L’Aquila (56.9), Rome 




Turin (60.2), Padua (60.4), Alessandria (60.4), Grosseto (60.5), Venezia (60.9), Pisa 
(61.0), Bergamo (61.1), Ascoli Piceno (61.2), Perugia (61.3), Gorizia (61.6), Sondrio 
(61.7), Savona (62.1), Udine (62.2), Imperia (62.4), Ancona (62.4), Rovigo (62.5), Rimini 
(62.6), Lecco (62.6), Trento (62.8), Brescia (62.9), Verona (63.1), Florence (63.2), 
Verbania (63.6), Milan (63.6), Asti (63.6), Pistoia (63.8), Como (63.8), Pesaro-Urbino 
(63.9), Lodi (64.0), Arezzo (64.0), Pavia (64.0), Cremona (64.2), Piacenza (64.2), Vercelli 
(64.3), Varese (64.3) and Macerata (64.9).  
ER 65-70% 
( 16 Provinces) 
 
Ferrara (65.0), Pordenone (65.0), Prato (65.0), Vicenza (65.6), Parma (65.8), Treviso 
(65.9), Novara (66.2), Cuneo (66.2), Biella (66.2), Aosta (66.4), Mantova (66.5), Siena 
(67.6), Belluno (67.7), Bologna (67.9), Forlì (69.1) and Modena (69.8). 
ER > 70% 
(3 Provinces) 
Bolzano (70.5), Ravenna (70.5) and Reggio Emilia (70.7). 
Coefficient of variation = 0.16 
Source: Istat, 2003. 
 
 
Table A2 - Female employment rates in Italian Provinces (2002) 
ER < 25% 
(9 Provinces) 
Caltanisetta (16.7), Crotone (20.5), Agrigento (20.6), Naples (20.8), Enna (21.1), Caserta 




Catania (25.1), Trapani (25.4), Cosenza (25.4), Taranto (25.9), Vibo Valentia (26.5), 
Ragusa (27.1), Salerno (27.8), Matera (27.9), Reggio Calabria (28.1), Bari (28.9), Nuoro 
(29.0), Lecce (29.6) and Catanzaro (29.9). 
ER 30-35% 
( 8 Provinces) 
Cagliari (30.3), Brindisi (30.6), Potenza (30.6), Latina (32.3), Frosinone (32.5), Oristano 
(32.9), Messina (33.2) and Sassari (34.6). 
ER 35-40% 
(5 Provinces) 
Avellino (35.8), Campobasso (36.2), Viterbo (37.0), Rieti (37.0) and Isernia (39.5).  
ER 40-45% 
( 10 Provinces) 
Benevento (40.4), La Spezia (40.6), Chieti (40.7), Pescara (40.8), L’Aquila (41.2), Terni 
(41.5), Teramo (42.5), Livorno (43.0), Massa (43.8) and Rome (44.4).  
ER 45-50% 
(12 Provinces) 
Bergamo (45.6), Lucca (45.8), Genova (46.3), Padua (46.6), Venice (47.3), Grosseto 
(47.6), Alessandria (48.1), Lecco (48.6), Imperia (49.2), Verona (49.2), Brescia (49.6) 
and Sondrio (49.9). 
ER 50-55% 
( 31 Provinces) 
 
Pisa (50.1), Turin (50.2), Trento (50.4), Perugia (50.5), Gorizia (50.8), Rovigo (51.2), 
Rimini (51.3), Cremona (51.3), Udine (51.4), Ascoli Piceno (51.5), Asti (51.5), Trieste 
(52.1), Como (52.3), Lodi (52.3), Prato (52.4), Piacenza (52.5), Ferrara (52.6), Pistoia 
(52.8), Verbania (52.9), Pesaro-Urbino (53.0), Treviso (53.1), Pordenone (53.3), Milan 
(53.5), Ancona (53.6), Savona (53.7), Florence (53.7), Pavia (53.8), Macerata (53.9), 
Vercelli (54.1), Arezzo (54.3), Cuneo (54.9) and Mantova (54.9). 
ER 55-60% 
( 8 Provinces) 
Varese (55.1), Vicenza (56.0), Aosta (56.5), Novara (56.9), Parma (57.5), Biella (58.4), 
Belluno (58.8) and Bolzano (59.7). 
ER > 60% 
(6 Provinces) 
Siena (60.3), Forlì (60.3), Bologna (61.1), Modena (62.2), Reggio Emilia (62.3) and 
Ravenna (62.5). 
  Coefficient of variation = 0.28 





Table A3 -  Total employment rates in the 16 local labour systems of the Region of Umbria 
 
ER 60-63% 
(9 Local labour systems) 
Perugia (62.6), Assisi (62.5), Umbertine (62.0), Castiglion 
del Lago (60.7), Gualdo Tadino (60.6), Norcia (60.5), Cascia 
(60.3), Città di Castello (60.1), Fabro (60.0). 
ER 56-60% 
(7 Local labour systems) 
Marsciano (59.9), Gubbio (59.8), Todi (59.6), Orvieto (59.4), 
Foligno (58.6), Spoleto (58.6), Terni (56.3). 
coefficient of variation = 0.026 
Source: Elaboration on ISTAT data. 
Note: the local labour systems in the Province of Terni are indicated in italics. 
 
 